About

I am a postdoctoral researcher in economics at the University of Basel, where I got my PhD in September 2022.

My research lies in health, labor, and public economics. I study the design of insurance markets and taxation systems. I develop theoretical models that motivate new causal identification designs, and implement them using large administrative or survey data.

In September 2024, I will be joining UC Berkeley as a postdoctoral fellow, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.

CV

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Research

Working papers

• Timing Moral Hazard under Deductibles in Health Insurance

  Abstract

  This paper evaluates whether individuals strategically time their healthcare consumption to reduce out-of-pocket costs, and the frictions they face in doing so. I set up a dynamic model of healthcare consumption in which individuals suffer a large health shock, exceed their deductible, and have an incentive to advance care from the following year. The model provides a sufficient statistic for timing moral hazard by comparing the consumption of individuals with shocks at random times within the coverage year. It also shows that advancing care mitigates classical moral hazard and adverse selection the following year. This insight highlights important trade-offs for insurance market design. In the context of mandatory health insurance in Switzerland, I find substantial timing moral hazard, though with strong dynamic frictions. The shorter the time horizon, the less care is advanced. The timing of health risk realizations has important implications for cost-sharing and insurance premiums.

  This paper earned the Young Economist Award from the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, as well as the Student Paper Prize 2nd place from the International Health Economics Association in 2023.

• Unemployment Insurance with Response Heterogeneity (with Conny Wunsch)

  Abstract

  The generosity of social insurance coverage often increases with the beneficiary's age and their contribution time to social security, but existing policies vary considerably. We study the differentiation of unemployment insurance (UI) generosity by evaluating how the insurance-incentive trade-off varies with age and contribution time. We exploit numerous discontinuities in potential benefit duration in Germany. Contribution time in the last three years carries information on job search efforts, as it is associated with lower moral hazard responses and fiscal externality. We find no significant response heterogeneity in age or longer contribution time horizons. Contrasting these gradients with an approximated insurance value for four UI regimes, we document that steepening the potential benefit duration schedule in contribution time and flattening it in age would have increased welfare.

• Hours Mismatch and Income Tax Incentives for Low-Earning Workers (with Ulrike Unterhofer) — draft available upon request

  Abstract

  Many workers do not work their desired number of hours, particularly in the low-earning segment. We study whether income tax notches generate hours mismatch in the context of mini jobs in Germany. These jobs are exempt from income and social security taxes up until a salient earnings threshold. We find substantial underemployment at the threshold, suggesting that it constrains many workers to work less than their optimum. A reform shifting the threshold upwards raised underemployment among mini jobbers. Workers increased their desired hours, but contracts adjusted through small increases in actual hours and wages. These findings are consistent with firms' hours constraints shaping job offers in the low-earning segment. They suggest that firms cater to workers' incentives to bunch, but overprovide mini jobs. While workers are able to achieve higher earnings in the adjustment, the aggravation in underemployment points to ambiguous effects on worker welfare.

Work in progress

• The Optimal Time-Profile of Unemployment Insurance Benefits (with Conny Wunsch).

Publications

• Zabrodina, Véra, Mark Dusheiko, and Karine Moschetti (2020). A Moneymaking Scan: Dual Reimbursement Systems and Supplier-Induced Demand for Diagnostic Imaging. Health Economics, 29(12):1566–1585.

  This paper won the iHEA Early Career Researcher Best Paper Prize.

• Moschetti, Karine, Véra Zabrodina, Tenzin Wangmo, Alberto Holly, Jean-Blaise Wasserfallen, Bernice S. Elger, and Bruno Gravier (2018). The determinants of healthcare expenditures of prisoners: Evidence from Switzerland. BMC Health Services Research, 18:160.

• Moschetti, Karine, Véra Zabrodina, Pierre Stadelmann, Tenzin Wangmo, Alberto Holly, Jean-Blaise Wasserfallen, Bernice S. Elger, and Bruno Gravier (2017). Exploring differences in healthcare utilization of prisoners in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland. PLOS ONE, 12(10):e0187255.

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Teaching

• Causal Inference for Policy Evaluation, MSc and PhD, University of Basel (2021-2024)

• Applied Empirical Analysis, MSc and PhD, University of Basel (2020)

• Empirical Research Methods in Labour Economics, MSc and PhD, University of Basel (2018, 2019)

• Advanced Empirical Research Methods, MSc and PhD, University of Basel (2018, 2019)

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Contact

Véra Zabrodina

University of Basel

Faculty of Business and Economics

Peter-Merian Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland

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