Welcome! I am a Postdoc in Economics at the University of Basel.
My interests lie in health economics, labour economics, social insurance design and applied econometrics.
I visited the Center for Labor Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, in spring 2022.
Before my doctoral studies, I worked as a research fellow in health economics at Unisanté.
I study how individuals respond to the economic incentives created by health insurance, unemployment insurance, and income taxation systems. Current topics include
- The strategic timing of healthcare consumption
- The design of unemployment insurance with heterogeneous responses to coverage generosity
- The labour supply responses of low-income workers to income tax incentives.
In my research, I develop new causal identification designs derived from theoretical models, and implement them using large administrative or survey data.
Timing Moral Hazard under Deductibles in Health Insurance. — draft available upon request
AbstractThis paper develops a new approach to identifying to what extent individuals strategically time their healthcare consumption under deductibles in health insurance. I set up a dynamic model of healthcare consumption where individuals exceed a high deductible after a large health shock, and have an incentive to prepone care planned for the next year. The model elicits the links between timing and classical moral hazard responses, as well as deductible choice, and highlights trade-offs for insurance policy. It also serves to show that pure timing moral hazard can be identified using random variation in the timing of the health shock within the calendar year. Empirically, I find quantitatively large timing moral hazard in the context of mandatory health insurance in Switzerland. This response can create important distortions in insurance markets by shifting out-of-pocket healthcare costs onto the risk pool. Its extent decreases with the time available until the deductible reset. The insured do re-optimise on-the-go after the shock, but face substantial frictions in retiming.
Unemployment Insurance with Response Heterogeneity (with Conny Wunsch). — draft available upon request
AbstractThe generosity of unemployment insurance (UI) coverage varies with the worker's age and time contributed to social security in many publicly-funded UI systems, despite a lack of evidence on their relevance for UI policy differentiation. This paper studies whether the responses to UI and the implied fiscal externality vary in these two characteristics. We use administrative data from Germany and a multi-cutoff regression discontinuity design to estimate a comprehensive set of duration and wage elasticities at many discontinuities in potential benefit duration. We find that the fiscal externality of UI decreases with contribution time, but increases with age. These gradients are mainly driven by the duration effects of UI, as any wage effects are small. Our results suggest that both age and short-term contribution time are indeed important determinants of UI responses, and thus relevant for policy differentiation. The moral hazard cost of UI can be reduced by reallocating resources towards younger workers with stable employment histories.
Hours Mismatch and Income Tax Incentives for Low-Earning Workers (with Ulrike Unterhofer). — draft available upon request
AbstractMany workers do not work their desired number of hours, particularly in the low-earning segment. We study whether income tax notches generate hours mismatch in the context of mini jobs in Germany. These jobs are exempt from income and social security taxes up until a salient earnings threshold. We find substantial underemployment at the threshold, suggesting that it constrains many workers to work less than their optimum. A reform shifting the threshold upwards raised underemployment among mini jobbers. Workers increased their desired hours, but contracts adjusted through small increases in actual hours and wages. These findings are consistent with firms' hours constraints shaping job offers in the low-earning segment. They suggest that firms cater to workers' incentives to bunch, but overprovide mini jobs. While workers are able to achieve more favourable hours-wage packages in the adjustment, the aggravation in underemployment points to ambiguous effects on worker welfare.
Work in progress
- The Optimal Time-Profile of Unemployment Insurance Benefits (with Conny Wunsch).
Zabrodina, Véra, Mark Dusheiko, and Karine Moschetti (2020). A Moneymaking Scan: Dual Reimbursement Systems and Supplier-Induced Demand for Diagnostic Imaging. Health Economics, 29(12):1566–1585.
This paper won the iHEA Early Career Researcher Best Paper Prize. Check out the follow-up interview by the iHEA Early Career Researcher Special Interest Group (ECR-SIG).
Moschetti, Karine, Véra Zabrodina, Tenzin Wangmo, Alberto Holly, Jean-Blaise Wasserfallen, Bernice S. Elger, and Bruno Gravier (2018). The determinants of healthcare expenditures of prisoners: Evidence from Switzerland. BMC Health Services Research, 18:160.
Moschetti, Karine, Véra Zabrodina, Pierre Stadelmann, Tenzin Wangmo, Alberto Holly, Jean-Blaise Wasserfallen, Bernice S. Elger, and Bruno Gravier (2017). Exploring differences in healthcare utilization of prisoners in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland. PLOS ONE, 12(10):e0187255.
Causal Inference for Policy Evaluation, M.Sc. and Ph.D., University of Basel (2021, 2022)
For this course lectured by Conny Wunsch, Ulrike Unterhofer and I teach lab sessions where we implement causal inference methods by replicating papers in R.
Check out the lab session materials on GitHub.
Applied Empirical Analysis, M.Sc. and Ph.D. (lab sessions and teaching assistance), University of Basel (2020)
Empirical Research Methods in Labour Economics, M.Sc. and Ph.D. (lab sessions and teaching assistance), University of Basel (2018, 2019)
Advanced Empirical Research Methods, M.Sc. and Ph.D. (teaching assistance), University of Basel (2018, 2019)
Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Basel
Peter-Merian Weg 6, 4002 Basel, Switzerland